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Abstract
This essay considers the question of how strategies of legitimatizing private regulatory governance evolve over the long
term. It focuses on the century-long history of the American Better Business Bureau (BBB) network, a linked set of business-
funded non-governmental organizations devoted to promoting truthful marketing. The BBBs took on important roles in
standard-setting, monitoring, public education, and enforcement, despite never enjoying explicit delegation of authority
from Congress or state legislatures. This effort depended on building legitimacy with three separate groups with very dif-
ferent perspectives and interests—the business community, a fractured American state, and the American public, in their
roles as consumers and investors. The BBBs initially managed to build a strong reputation with each constituency during
its founding period, from 1912 to 1933. The Bureaus then in many ways adapted successfully to the emergence of a more
assertive regulatory state from the New Deal through the mid 1970s. Eventually, however, the resurgence of conservative
politics in the United States exposed the challenges of satisfying such divergent stakeholders, and led the BBBs to focus
resolutely on shoring up its support from the business establishment. That choice, over time, undercut the Bureaus stand-
ing with other stakeholders, and especially the wider public. This history illustrates: the salience of generational amnesia
within private regulatory institutions; the profound impact that the shifting nature of public faith in government can have
on the strategies and reputation of private regulatory bodies; and the extent to which private regulators face long-term
trade-offs among strategies to sustain legitimacy with different audiences. It also suggests a rich set of research questions
for longer-term histories of other private regulatory institutions, in the United States, other societies, and at the interna-
tional level.
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anti-fraud regulation; Better Business Bureaus; ethnography of regulatory governance; history of self-regulation; institu-
tional reputation; legitimization trade-offs
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1. Introduction
Modern self-regulatory bodies—that is, non-govern-
mental institutions associated with the business com-
munity that set regulatory standards, engage in pub-
lic education about those rules, monitor how firms
live up to them, and even sanction those enterprises
that violate their requirements—operate against a back-
drop of skepticism. Such institutions, of course, have
a very long history, substantially pre-dating the emer-
gence of technocratic public regulatory agencies. For cen-
turies, European guilds and professional societies set the
terms of market activity in specific sectors (De Moor,
2008). As countries industrialized in the nineteenth- and
early twentieth-centuries, leaders in many economic
sectors invented new forms of self-regulation. In some
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cases, as with the creation of stock and commodity ex-
changes, the goal was to coordinate market activity; in
others, the objective was to respond to problems asso-
ciated with industrialization, like the difficulties of en-
suring pure milk for urban consumers or the “smoke
nuisance” that bedeviled so many fast-growing cities.
(Adams, 1908; Uekotter, 1999). But as concepts of demo-
cratic sovereignty began to spread in the wake of the
American and French Revolutions, self-regulatory organi-
zations faced new and growing challenges to their legiti-
macy that have only intensified over the past century.
Business-owners and managers sometimes, and per-
haps often, view private regulatory organizations as busy-
bodies that are almost as intrusive as governmental reg-
ulators. Upstart firms in particular tend to equate self-
regulatory efforts schemes with anti-competitive mea-
sures to shore up the market position of established
firms. Legislators, state regulatory agencies, and the ju-
diciary may all see self-regulatory bodies as threats to
their own authority. Social activists and the broader pub-
lic, meantime, frequently presume that privatemodes of
regulation serve primarily to deflect pressures for more
stringent governmental responses to economic or social
problems. By contrast, defenders of self-regulation often
argue that such institutional modes of governance can
often address complicated regulatory problems more ef-
fectively than public regulation, and at lower cost. Such
arguments often have particularly strong force when
regulatory policy-making concerns highly technical ques-
tions in which corporations and industry insiders pos-
sess extensive expertise (Balleisen, 2010; Balleisen & Eis-
ner, 2009). Disputes over legitimacy, then, tend to swirl
aroundprivate regulatory governance, raising interlinked
questions about competence, effectiveness, and the ap-
propriate sources of regulatory decision-making within
democratic societies.
Scholars across the social sciences have come to un-
derstand these contested tropes about self-regulation.
So too have policy-makers. From at least the early
twentieth-century, state official in industrialized democ-
racies have periodically fashioned strategies of co-
regulation, in the hopes of gaining the benefits of self-
regulationwhile limiting its costs.With co-regulation, the
state delegates significant regulatory functions to self-
regulatory bodies, but retains supervisory authority over
them. This complex approach to regulatory design has
come to characterize such policy domains as: securities
regulation, which across the world relies on accountants,
corporate attorneys, and stock exchanges, as well as na-
tional regulatory bodies (Carson, 2011; McCraw, 1982);
workplace safety regulation, in which governments often
rely on work councils made up of union and company
representatives to construct operational plans, which
governmental officials audit (Gunningham & Johnstone,
1999); and food safety regulation, in which national regu-
latory agencies increasingly rely on self-regulatory plans
and implementation mechanisms created by corpora-
tions that process and distribute food products (Havinga,
2006; Sharma, Teret, & Brownell, 2010).
For the most part, social science research into how
private regulators try to legitimate their authority takes
the formof intensive case studies of a given regulatory in-
stitution over a fairly short period of time. Often, those
case studies also only investigate issues of legitimation
indirectly or as part of a wider consideration of the ori-
gins and impacts of self-regulation in a given context.1
This essay takes a much longer view, exploring the evo-
lution of American Better Business Bureaus (BBBs) over
more than a century. Such macro-historical perspective
allows us to see how strategies to secure the institutional
legitimacy of private regulation evolved in the face of
new circumstances.
Dating from 1912, the BBBs began as local associ-
ations in American cities, run by volunteers within the
American advertising sector who wished to root out de-
ceptive marketing practices by consumer retailers, in-
vestment brokers, and the advertising firms on which
they relied. Within fifteen years, BBB leaders had devel-
oped a national umbrella organization, raised funds from
national corporations and local businesses to hire pro-
fessional staff, lobbied to shape anti-fraud policies on
the state and national levels, and built out institutional
capacity around standard-setting, public education, and
norm enforcement. They had also forged deep connec-
tions with print media editors and publishers, business
leaders in the new domain of radio, trade associations
throughout the economy, large-scale retail corporations,
and state and federal officials responsible for regulating
the truthfulness of commercial speech. In all of these
activities, the BBBs articulated a cohesive philosophy of
business self-regulation, predicated on the ethical de-
mands of a businessmen’s social movement for truth-in-
advertising. Over the subsequent five decades, the BBBs
adapted to a steadily more assertive regulatory state,
always looking to carve out a substantial role for self-
regulatory organizations, while accepting a more vigor-
ous role for state regulatory oversight. From the 1970s
onwards, however, the BBBs confronted new pressures
from within the business community and the political
world, as a resurgent conservativism threatened its fund-
ing base and encouraged a less cooperative stance to-
ward state regulatory institutions.2
This organizational history offers several insights
about the challenges that non-governmental regulatory
institutions confront as they seek to establish and sus-
tain niches within ecologies of regulatory governance.
The BBBs had to worry about three different, if some-
times overlapping types of legitimation. First, they had
1 For wide-ranging examples, see the extensive literature cited in Balleisen (2010).
2 I give the institutional evolution of the BBBs close attention in a recent book (Balleisen, 2017). This essay draws heavily on the research for that volume,
as well as a related 2009 article (Balleisen, 2009). Here I offer a more synoptic assessment of the BBBs’ history in light of the core questions driving this
comparative special issue.
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to build and then maintain a base of support among
the business community. Themost important imperative
here was to attract funding from a sufficient cohort of
entrenched firms, but the Bureaus also needed to cul-
tivate a reputation for trustworthiness among a wider
set of enterprises. Second, the BBBs sought to gain the
trust of legislators and regulatory officials, not only as an
important stakeholder deserving of respect in policy dis-
cussions, but also as a partner in rule-making, dissemina-
tion of norms, and enforcement of those standards. Fi-
nally, the Bureaus wished to earn and keep the trust of
consumers and investors as vital arbiters of fair dealing
in the American marketplace. The strategies of legitima-
tion fashioned by the BBBs varied depending on the au-
dience. In addition, BBB approaches to the challenges of
legitimation also shifted, sometimes quite dramatically,
with transformations in the wider socioeconomic, politi-
cal, and policy environment.
The history of the BBBs, then, has involved multi-
faceted, changing modes of legitimation. No doubt the
tangled threads in this narrative reflect the distinctive
characteristics of the BBB network. Thework of these pri-
vate regulatory bodies ranged across much of the econ-
omy (rather than involving just one industry or sector,
as is the case for many self-regulatory entities), and did
not occur on the basis of explicit delegation of authority
from the state (unlike, for example, the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, now known as the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority). The BBB network also
occurred mostly within the confines of a single nation
(though some Bureaus operated in some Canadian cities
as well as in the United States). Nonetheless, I suspect
that this case study also has more general implications
for understanding the dilemmas faced by modern self-
regulatory bodies that seek to forge positive reputations,
whether for competence, fairness, democratic character,
or effectiveness. No matter how durable the legitimacy
of a given regulatory institution may seem at a given mo-
ment with a given constituency, wider socio-economic,
cultural, and political shifts can recast the pressures bear-
ing down on that institution, and hence its strategies of
legitimation. In addition, there often will be trade-offs
among legitimation strategies targeted at separate con-
stituencies with different interests and points of view.
That is, a successful campaign of legitimation with one
stakeholder may, over time, risk de-legitimation with
other stakeholders.3 By the same token, a private regu-
lator that can lay claim to some effectiveness may, over
time, lose sight of some of the sources of that regula-
tory success.
This essay first offers a brief sketch of the history
of the BBB network, divided into three main periods—a
founding era, from 1912 to 1933; a period of accommo-
dation with a more assertive public sector, from 1933
through the early 1970s; and a period of reenergized
conservatism, from the mid 1970s to the present. After
this historical overview, the article considers the evolv-
ing strategies of legitimation adopted by this important
institution of American business self-regulation. Leaders
within all regulatory institutions, indeed leaders within
all policy institutions, have to pay at least some attention
to reputational considerations. But this imperative takes
on distinctive dimensions for private regulatory institu-
tions that lack the color of state authority.
2. Origins
The American Truth-in-Advertising movement repre-
sented, in part, a collective search for respectability and
social standing. From the 1850s into the early twentieth
century, advertising agencies, newspapers, and maga-
zines had depended on patent medicine advertisements
for a significant share of income, and those ads noto-
riously made outlandish claims of miraculous impacts
(Young, 1961). Even when advertising agencies attracted
business from a wider set of products, their advertise-
ments often embraced manipulative or deceptive tac-
tics. As a result, advertising executives confronted neg-
ative stereotypes that depicted them as shady operators
who lacked scruples. At the same time, some upscale
marketers concluded that the prevalence of misleading
claims in advertising copy had generated widespread
public skepticism about advertising in general, reduc-
ing its capacity to move consumers to buy.4 For a clus-
ter of advertising managers in more established agen-
cies and corporate managers responsible for marketing,
these concerns justified collective action to rein in the
worst kinds of duplicity in the American marketplace.
The first efforts took place within Midwestern cities,
beginning in Minneapolis, and then spread to urban cen-
ters around the country. In addition to organizing local
“vigilance committees” devoted to an ideology of truth-
fulness in commercial speech, early leaders lobbied for
new state laws thatmade false advertising a criminalmis-
demeanor. The biggest focus of these new urban orga-
nizations was on retail marketing practices. But in New
York City, Boston, and other large eastern cities, the BBB
(as they came to be called by the early 1920s) also tar-
geted sales of unlisted securities (that is, investment
vehicles not listed on one of the country’s established
stock exchanges).5
From the outset, the most important strategy of the
BBBs was to educate consumers and investors so that
they could sidestep bad deals and outright scams. The
Bureaus churned out educational pamphlets, deputized
spokespersons to speak to community organizations and
write articles for city newspapers, and placed cautionary
ads all over urban America. Alongside this strategy of pre-
3 For a magisterial example of how the organizational reputation of a regulatory body can shift over time, see Carpenter (2010).
4 Scholars such as Fox (1984); Marchand (1986); Lears, (1994); and Stole (2006) have probed the cultural debates prompted by these developments,
which included intensifying attacks against advertising for claims that were exaggerated, misleading, or false.
5 For a wide-ranging history/memoir of the early Truth-in-Advertising movement, see Kenner (1936).
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vention, BBBs established mechanisms to monitor mar-
keting practices. Every BBB encouraged local residents to
bring it complaints of unfair or unscrupulous sales tactics,
and also surveyed local ads, and then sent out employ-
ees to see whether businesses lived up to their adver-
tised promises. If a Bureau found evidence of deceptive
selling, it would contact the business in question to seek
redress. Should a firm refused to engage with BBB offi-
cials, they would publicize the incident in its publications
(what scholars of business regulation would now call a
strategy of “shaming”) and even suggest that media out-
lets refuse its advertising business (a form of “shunning”)
(Gunningham & Rees, 1997; King & Lennox, 2000; Porter
& Ronit, 2006).
Such ambitious self-regulatory efforts soon out-
stripped the capacity of volunteers, leading the BBBs
to create full-time professional staffs within a few years
of their creation, funded by membership dues from lo-
cal businesses.6 By the end of the 1920s, the BBB net-
work had more employees than the United States Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), which was responsible not
only for regulating deceptivemarketing in interstate com-
merce, but also the oversight of antitrust law. The Bu-
reaus had also established a continental association, the
National Better Business Bureau, to share intelligence
and organizational strategies among local organizations.
3. The BBBs amid a Consolidating Regulatory State
During the 1910s and 1920s, the BBBs cultivated close
relationships with the American state at every jurisdic-
tional level. In addition to lobbying for tighter legal prohi-
bitions against deceptivemarketing, including state-level
criminal prohibitions against false advertising, the Bu-
reaus worked closely with trade associations and the FTC
to draft sectoral “trade practice rules”. These compila-
tions laid out detailed standards for business communi-
cation in scores of specific industries. The BBBs further
built strong links to local, state, and federal prosecutors.
If established businesses engaged in duplicitous market-
ing and ignored BBB efforts to convince them to change
their ways, or if firms embraced outright swindles, BBB
officials did not hesitate to refer cases to the criminal jus-
tice system. Such referrals occurred roughly once for ev-
ery one hundred BBB investigations. In this initial phase,
the BBBs more often than not defined the course of anti-
fraud policies (Balleisen, 2009).
The emergence of New Deal policies and institutions
as responses to the Great Depression, and then the ex-
tension of consumer-protection measures in the post-
World War II decades, moved American anti-fraud poli-
cies away from the nineteenth-century preference for a
logic of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), and to-
ward a logic of caveat venditor (let the seller beware.) In
the process, these policies curbed the Bureaus’ capacity
to influence the broad direction of anti-deception regu-
lation. Confronting far more vigorous regulatory muscle-
flexing by American governments from the 1930s to the
1970s, Bureau leadersmostly adopted a stance of accom-
modation. That is, they accepted the general trend,while
attempting to shape its specific implications.
In the policing of fraudulent investments and decep-
tivemarketing or trading of securities, the BBBs gaveway
before a new regulatory complex that was centered on
the new national Securities & Exchange Commission, but
also incorporated a panoply of other self-regulatory bod-
ies (stock exchanges, professional organizations of audi-
tors and accountants, and the new National Association
of Securities Dealers). In other domains, like deceptive
retail marketing, the BBBs looked to deepen their en-
gagement with public authorities. Scores of BBB officials
participated in the sectoral code authorities established
by the Roosevelt Administration’s short-lived National
Recovery Administration, helping to define and enforce
public instantiations of trade practice rules (Chicago Tri-
bune, 1933; New York City Better Business Bureau, 1933).
For a quarter century after the Supreme Court struck
down the NRA as unconstitutional, BBB leaders contin-
ued to collaborate with trade associations and the FTC.
Together, business associations, the BBBs, and FTC offi-
cials convened sectoral trade practice conferences and
drafted voluntary sectoral fair practice standards, which
despite their voluntary nature guided FTC enforcement
of its general prohibitions against deceptive business
practices in interstate trade (FTC, 1958, 1959; The Yale
Law Journal, 1953).
From the late 1950s through the middle 1970s, state
and local governments increasingly challenged BBBs as
champions of consumer protection in local markets.
Across the country, city councils, metropolitan counties,
and state legislatures passed a raft of ordinances and
law that tightened restrictions on deceptive or fraudu-
lent marketing. State and local authorities further cre-
ated new consumer protection agencies that had respon-
sibilities like those of the BBBs. That is, the new con-
sumer protection bureaus invested heavily in public ed-
ucation, monitored marketplaces, served as complaint
clearinghouses, and engaged in informal mediation be-
tween disgruntled consumers and retail firms.7
Even though these state bodies directly competed
with BBBs for the attention and loyalty of urban con-
sumers, most BBB officials settled on a strategy of co-
operation, viewing any other stance as asking for pub-
lic condemnation in an era of growing consumer ac-
tivism. These leaders had begun their BBB careers during
the Great Depression or in World War II. While they re-
tained a fervent belief in the importance of business self-
regulation, they had grown accustomed to more expan-
sive state efforts at investor and consumer protection,
and saw little value in challenging the direction of public
6 An early annual report from the Boston Better Business Commission (as the local BBB branch initially called itself) offers a particularly extensive overview
of early BBB philosophy and strategy (The Boston Better Business Commission, 1922).
7 For a concise overview of these developments, see Bruns (1974).
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policy.8 Indeed, toward the end of this period, the BBBs
sometimes emulated public consumer-protection institu-
tions, nowhere more so than in the decision of many Bu-
reaus during the late 1960s and early 1970s to create
branch offices in inner city neighborhoods, bringing BBB
education initiatives and consumer services to previously
ignored communities.
4. A Conservative Pivot
Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, a growing num-
ber of younger BBB officials, especially from Sun Belt
cities like Atlanta, Houston, and Phoenix, chafed under
the longstanding BBB stance of accommodation. These
individuals were influenced by experiences in corporate
America and their region’s renewed conservatism, rather
than decades-long acculturation with the realities of ex-
panded regulatory power. Aligning themselves with the
growing critics of regulatory overreach, they voiced op-
position to frequent, cozy interactions between BBB of-
ficials and public regulators. As one Atlanta BBB leader
put it in 1965:
We in Atlanta have long ago decided that our local
problems can be best be handled on a local basis
andwithout the assistance of the FTC, SEC,…Food and
Drug Administration, orwhatever….Wedo not receive
one dime from the government and don’t want any
of their money. By the same token, we don’t want
any of their publicity. We are supposed to speak for
business….Our conversations should be business con-
versations, and our files should be business files, and
our information should be business information, and
our reports should be business reports, and our stan-
dards should be business standards….If we are to play
cops and robbers, then I think we should change the
misnomer we call a slogan, “Private Enterprise In the
Public’s Interest”, to “Business SupportedAgencies for
the Purpose of Squealing on Business”.
In addition to calling for reinvigorated connections to
corporate America, the conservatives also argued that
the BBBs needed to develop amore sustainable business
plan. The latter stance included support for allowing in-
dividual businesses that joined a local BBB to advertise
that fact, something that the Bureaus had refused to do
for more than a half-century.9
As economic stagnation in the 1970s gave a boost
to conservative politics and policies, such views gained
more purchase within the BBBs. Over the course of the
1980s and 1990s, the BBBs invested far less in public
education, though they did build out an early presence
on the internet. In the early 1980s, the national um-
brella organization declared that local BBBs could allow
businesses to communicate their membership through
a BBB symbol on storefronts and via advertisements.
Local BBBs also became far less likely to refer busi-
nesses to regulatory agencies or criminal prosecutors.
During the 1990s and 2000s and at the behest of retail-
ers who wanted a means of deflecting consumer com-
plaints, most BBBs began to offer formal arbitration as
a means of settling consumer disputes. The Bureaus fur-
ther instituted a grading system for businesses (from A
to F, as with marks in American education), a move that
has occasioned allegations that the BBBs offer excellent
grades tomembers regardless of their business practices,
and give poor marks to many non-member businesses,
again regardless of their record of complaints and adjust-
ments (Ambrose, 2009; Belkin, 1984; Los Angeles Sen-
tinel, 1979; Oldenburg, 1997). On thewhole, the BBB net-
work moved closer in its mission and organizational cul-
ture to the interests of those businesses who provided it
with funding.
5. Patterns of Legitimization and De-Legitimization
This historical overview provides essential context for
any attempt to reflect on shifting practices of legitima-
tion during the more than one hundred years that the
BBBs have been a part of anti-deception regulation in
theUnited States. Since its inception, the BBBmovement
has been obsessed with questions of legitimacy. But one
must take care to distinguish three separate constituen-
cies through which BBB leaders have sought to establish
and sustain reputation and authority: the business com-
munity; the state; and the wider investing and consum-
ing public. The balance of concern for these stakeholders
has shifted greatly across the past century, as have the
strategies and tactics that BBB officials have pursued in
either creating or sustaining their legitimacy with one or
another of the three groups.
In the BBB’s founding era, organizational leaders
wished to improve the standing of marketers in general,
and advertising agencies in particular. This goal required
that they convince a critical mass of the business com-
munity to accept the principles of “truth in advertising”,
not just in the abstract, but through financial contribu-
tions thatwould support a robust bureaucratic infrastruc-
ture and through acceptance of BBB authority to deter-
minewhat counted as deceptivemarketing. In part, early
BBB officials gained traction within the business commu-
nity through sustained efforts at moral suasion. Drawing
on the culture and values of evangelical Protestant Chris-
tianity, BBB leaders exhorted corporate executives and
small business-owners to live up to a higher creed than
the relentless pursuit of short-term profit. Rituals and
good fellowship at local meetings and national confer-
ences proved to be crucial elements of these efforts at
8 W. Dan Bell, the head of the Denver Better Business Bureau for more than two decades after World War II, exemplified BBB professionalism. See his
extensive papers at the Denver Public Library.
9 James Stephens to Dan Berry, Jr., August 26, 1965; Dan Berry, Jr., “There Are Termites in the Basement,” August 30, 1965, both in W. Dan Bell Papers,
Denver Public Library.
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community organizing. So too did arguments that even
the best-intentioned firms could benefit from checks and
balances on their day to day practices. Some department
store executives welcomed the development of BBB ad
monitoring, on the grounds that it would curb any decep-
tive or manipulative selling practices that might be fos-
tered by commission-based compensation frameworks
(Accuracy, 1925; Balleisen, 2009).
The BBBs further appealed to the aversion that many
businessmen had to expansive exercise of state power,
a key theme in scholarly accounts of the circumstances
that foster the creation of self-regulatory institutions
(Balleisen & Eisner, 2009). BBB standard-setting, moni-
toring, and informal modes of enforcement—all concep-
tualized as business “home rule”—offered the prospect
of staving off the expansion of more intrusive state-
based investor and consumer protection regulations.
This line of argument was also attractive to Republi-
can elected officials such as Presidents Calvin Coolidge
and Herbert Hoover, who shared a strong skepticism
of expansive state bureaucracy, preferring public coordi-
nation of self-regulatory organizations (Accuracy, 1926;
Hawley, 1981; New York Times, 1930).
A further source of legitimacy for the early BBB net-
work involved perceived regulatory effectiveness, which
mattered not only to businesses, but also to public offi-
cials, investors, and consumers. Through the 1920s, the
BBBs took every opportunity to burnish their creden-
tials as inveterate opponents of marketplace deceptions
and as institutions with technocratic expertise in root-
ing them out. In addition to developing vigorous cam-
paigns of public education, BBB leaders pushed their
activities into the public spotlight at every opportunity,
relying heavily on close relationships with urban news-
papers and national magazines. In hundreds of articles
published across the country, the consistent message
was that the BBBs had quickly learned how to: convene
standard-setting deliberations about fair business prac-
tices within specific sectors; build outmonitoringmecha-
nisms for urbanmarketplaces (which depended on corps
of female shoppers who would check on whether firms
lived up to their promises in advertisements); and deftly
mediate complaints that consumers and investors had
against retail firms. All of this expertise, moreover, os-
tensibly rested on the capacity of BBBs to act quickly,
informally, and at much lower cost than governmen-
tal agencies.10
A 1937 cartoon that appeared in the Cleveland Plain
Dealer (Figure 1) nicely conveys the BBB’s the message
of effectiveness. The artist depicts the organization as
a beneficent sun, which disinfects the urban market-
place through its powerful rays of actionable informa-
tion about business practices. Recognizing how difficult
the city’s environment has become for deceptive sales-
manship, a “Business Faker”, sweating profusely from the
power of anti-fraud light and heat, turns tail and heads
elsewhere in search of easier marks.
Figure 1. Depicting the ostensible impact of BBB anti-
fraud work. Source: Cleveland Plain Dealer (1937).
There were scattered dissenters to such rosy depic-
tions of BBB regulatory undertakings. Retailers and stock
promoterswhose business practices received condemna-
tions from the BBBs lambasted them as unelected busy-
bodies whose surveillancemethods and coercive threats
of public shaming lacked a shred of legitimacy, especially
in a society that valued fairness and due process. For
these critics, the BBBs constituted a protection racket, ex-
tracting membership dues from businesses as the price
of not facing BBB ire, and insulating entrenched firms
from competition. Indeed, some businesses on the re-
ceiving of negative publicity from a Bureau went so far
as to sue the organization for libel (Justia, 2016; Riegel,
1931; O’Sullivan, 1933; The Lance, 1933).
Despite such criticisms and occasional legal attacks,
urban populations and governing elites both quickly
came to see the BBBs as valuable institutions. By the
late 1920s, BBBs annually attracted tens of thousands of
inquiries and complaints from consumers and investors
who wanted information about a business or assistance
with a grievance. The network enjoyed financial sup-
port from the largest department stores, smaller retail-
ers, and the nation’s investment banks. They had forged
close links to urban district attorneys, some state attor-
neys general, and federal officials at the FTC. The BBB
network had, in other words, gained significant institu-
tional legitimacy. Outcomes in defamation suits against
local Bureaus reflected this level of esteem, as state and
federal courts routinely ruled in their favor (The Boston
BBB Bulletin, 1929).
10 Kenner’s The Fight for Truth in Advertising discusses each of these features of BBB strategy and tactics at great length.
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During the New Deal, World War II, and post-World
War II decades, the BBBs confronted a series of new
political, legal, and economic realities that encouraged
reorientation of its strategies of legitimation. The orga-
nization continued to stress the efficiencies of its self-
regulatory practices, as well as the extent to which most
businesses accorded them respect. But it added new
twists, such as a more sustained linkage of its activi-
ties and ethos to American anti-communism. BBB lead-
ers additionally emphasized, more so than in their first
two decades, that they possessed a degree of indepen-
dence from the corporations, partnerships, and propri-
etorships that floated their operations. They described
themselves as the “umpires of American business adver-
tising”, likening themselves to dispassionate sports refer-
ees who ensured a level playing field for vigorous capital-
ist competition.11
The mid-century BBBs, moreover, had to cope with a
much more assertive regulatory state. Where possible,
BBB leaders looked for ways to meld their own opera-
tionswith those of regulatory agencies, as with the short-
lived code authorities of the Depression-era National Re-
covery Administration, or the FTC’s prioritization of regu-
latory campaigns against bait and switch advertising and
fictitious pricing tactics in the late 1950s. Where neces-
sary, they ceded ground, as with securities regulation,
which the BBBs left to the SEC and financial industry
self-regulatory bodies. At all points, they worked to sus-
tain operational integration with regulatory institutions
at every jurisdictional level of government. That goal de-
pended on the cultivation of ongoing relationships with
regulatory officials, whether through discussions about
rule-making and priorities for enforcement activities, or
through information sharing.12
On the whole, the BBBs retained considerable stand-
ing throughout these decades. Amid remarkable postwar
prosperity, businesses continued to fund BBB operations.
Indeed, the BBBs expanded coverage not only to more
than a score of new cities in the 1950s and 1960s, but
also to suburban neighborhoods through the opening of
new branch offices. The urban public continued to rely
on BBB services, with annual inquiries and complaints
reaching into the millions. National political leaders, in-
cluding every President from Roosevelt through Nixon,
publicly commended the BBBs as a vital element in the
nation’s anti-fraud/deception infrastructure.13
Moreover, the BBBs in this era were at least occa-
sionally willing to scrutinize the marketing practices of
larger corporations as well as smaller firms. From 1966
through 1968, for example, BBBs around the country co-
ordinated a multi-year investigation of bait and switch
tactics atmany Sears department stores, one of the coun-
try’s most powerful corporations. After consumers were
lured into Sears stores by ads detailing low prices for
durable consumer goods like vacuum cleaners, salesper-
sons would try to convince them to purchase a more ex-
pensive product. BBB officials around the country consis-
tently brought such behavior to the attention of Sears’
executives in their communities, who repeatedly apol-
ogized, offered to adjust the concerns of any disgrun-
tled customers, and pledged to clamp down on such sell-
ing practices.14
Nonetheless, challenges to BBB legitimacy intensi-
fied from the 1950s onwards. Although many national
corporations and entrenched local businesses remained
committed to BBB work during this era, a growing num-
ber of firms issued complaints about the lack of due
process in BBB enforcement efforts. This concern had
emerged as early as the 1920s, when the New York City
department store Macy’s faced a BBB demand that it
drop its claim that it offered the lowest prices in the city,
since its goods periodically were undercut by competi-
tors. After a long negotiation, Macy’s resigned from BBB
membership rather than cede a degree of control over its
marketing (The New York Better Business Bureau, 1926).
During the post-WorldWar II decades, worries about pro-
cedural fairness were sharpened by legal reforms in pub-
lic regulation.Most notably, the 1946 Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA), enacted at the behest of business inter-
ests, imposed far more stringent standards of procedu-
ral fairness in administrative enforcement actions under-
taken by federal regulatory agencies (Grisinger, 2012).
Several BBBs responded to the new focus on due pro-
cess by emulating aspects of the APA. These Bureaus es-
tablished local review boards that would entertain ap-
peals from businesses who objected to BBB determina-
tions that their advertising or other business practices
were deceptive. These boards would hold hearings in
which firms would enjoy many procedural rights, such
as the right to be represented by an attorney, and the
right to see evidence compiled against them. In the early
1970s, the national BBB followed suit, creating a review
board related to its monitoring of nationwide broadcast
and magazine advertising. But these efforts at solidify-
ing legitimacy with some businesses came with costs. To
the extent that procedural protections delayed quick reg-
ulatory action (such as publicizing BBB determinations
of deceptive practices), it limited regulatory effective-
ness. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission ruled
that the BBBs had to be careful in structuring any ap-
11 Kenneth Barnard to Clyde Kemery,March 23, 1960, Box 6, Folder 1, Better Business Bureau ofMetropolitan Chicago Records, Chicago HistoryMuseum.
12 The records of the Chicago Better Business Bureau, held by the Chicago History Museum, furnish especially detailed evidence about the degree of
cooperation between BBB representatives and regulatory officials in the states and federal government. See for example the letters, pamphlets, and
internal memos in Box 15, Folder 2, concerning relations between the Chicago BBB and the new Illinois Consumer Fraud Bureau in the early 1960s.
13 For an overview of post-World War II growth in BBBs, as well as the endorsements provided by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, see
Facts You Should Know about Your Better Business Bureau: Public Service of Private Business in the Public Interest (circa early 1960s), Box 9, Folder 2,
BBB of Metropolitan Chicago Records, Chicago History Museum; Changing Times (1965).
14 See the set of letters and memos on the Sears investigation in Box 209, Folder 4, Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan of Chicago; and correspon-
dence among BBB officials across the country about the Sears issue in Box 1, W. Dan Bell Papers, Denver Public Library.
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peals processes and enforcement actions, since compul-
sory sanctions would violate the FTC’s regulatory juris-
diction (Albuquerque Journal, 1966; FTC, 1966; Van Cise,
1966; Zanot, 1979).
The BBB network also came under increasing fire dur-
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s for not sufficiently
expanding capacity to be able to keep track of the con-
sumer marketplace, or to handle a crush of complaints
encouraged by the growth of organized consumerism.
Staff at individual bureaus struggled to keep files about
local businesses up-to-date; they even struggled to an-
swer the unending stream of phone calls that bom-
barded BBB offices. The urban riots of the 1960s further
placed a media spotlight on pervasive consumer frauds
and rip-offs in poor urban neighborhoods, which the
BBBs had largely ignored. All of these critiques received a
thorough airing through an investigative report commis-
sioned by aNewYork City congressman, Benjamin Rosen-
thal, in the early 1970s (Congressional Record, 1971).
Institutional responses to erosion in popular legiti-
macy took two opposing tacks. Some local BBBs, such
as the one in New York City, calculated that they had to
make further concessions to the consumer movement,
and looked to hire new leaders from its ranks, as well
as to invest more heavily in consumer outreach (Cerra,
1978). But especially in the Sun Belt, BBBs tilted to-
ward the preferences of themore conservative, business-
focused leaders who had begun to assume positions of
authority. Their concern rested more on the need to re-
tain legitimacy in the eyes of the corporations and local
enterprises who supplied the fees that allows the BBBs
to function. Even in a city like Chicago, leadership transi-
tions could dampen ardor for taking on the big boys. De-
spite the extensive evidence that the Chicago BBB com-
piled about the deceptive selling techniques of Sears’ em-
ployees, the Bureau shied away frompublicly challenging
Sears; sterner action against bait and switch selling at the
retailer only occurred some years later, in 1976, when
the Federal Trade Commission publicly cited the firm for
deceptive selling practices (Wall Street Journal, 1976).15
As noted above, the inclination to reestablish tighter
relations with the business establishment became more
and more powerful in the subsequent four decades. This
impulse drove the decisions to allow firms to display their
BBB membership, to shy away from close cooperation
with government consumer protection officials, and then
to issue public grades of businesses as a means to bol-
ster their supposed good reputation. Confronting a resur-
gent conservativism in large swaths of the business com-
munity, and a wider political turn toward deregulation
and the older ethos of caveat emptor, the BBBs worried
less about their standing with government officials and
consumers, and more about their standing with private
sector funders. The imperatives of epistemic legitimacy
(showing government agencies and citizens that BBBs
had expertise in keeping abreast of prevalent frauds and
assisting public regulators in constraining them) accord-
ingly diminished. So too did concern about the demon-
stration of professional autonomy. By contrast, attention
to procedural legitimacy within local business communi-
ties expanded, as signified by the heavy investment that
BBBs put into arbitration services.
Public reputation ebbed as a result of these inter-
secting shifts. As late as the 1960s, the BBB network
could lay claim to considerable legitimacy from each of
its three main constituencies (business leaders, govern-
ment regulators, and the wider public, particularly in ur-
ban America, where they established their operations).
Most Americans who lived in metropolitan areas knew
about the BBB network; indeed a Roper public opinion
survey in 1967 found that 81% of Americans were fa-
miliar with it, despite its thin reach into small towns
and rural areas (National Better Business Bureau Bulletin,
1967). Governmental regulators also mostly continued
to view the BBBs as key partners in regulating the truth-
fulness of commercial speech. Even as late as 1975, one
could encounter an editorial cartoon in a major newspa-
per like the Chicago Tribune that implicitly characterized
the BBBs as effective policemen of the advertising world.
In this case (figure 2), a surgeon coming out of an operat-
ing theatre sees a headline suggesting that the longstand-
ing prohibition on advertising by doctors might be com-
ing to an end. His response, that he has no intention to
“mess with the Better Business Bureau”, communicated
that the BBBs still enjoyed a reputation as powerful mon-
itors whom businesses were bound to respect.
By the 2000s, however, far fewer Americans had a
clear sense of the BBBs purpose or impact, and there
was much less confidence that it would assist in mediat-
ing consumer complaints. Indeed, the BBBs began to con-
front regular, stinging criticism from a slew of consumer
websites, aswell as negative press coverage. Themost re-
cent critiques allege that the organization operates less
as a regulatory institution and more as a means of buck-
ing up the reputation of businesses that engage in the
sort of commercial behavior that prompted creation of
the BBBs more than a century ago.16 In these accounts,
the BBBs had chosen to emulate the common tropes of
self-regulatory organization as smoke screen or window
dressing, as a means of appearing to rein in business,
without actually doing so (Coombs & Holladay, 2011).
The evolution of American BBBs suggests the analyt-
ical pay-off of tracing modes of private regulatory gover-
nance over the long term.Whether those modes involve
industry associations, third-party Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations and private auditors, or self-regulatory units
within businesses themselves, the challenges of legiti-
matizing regulatory authority almost always involve mul-
tiple constituencies. Private regulatory institutions may
view those constituencies as equally important or of
varying importance; they may adopt strategies of legit-
imation that cut across these groups, or tailor strate-
15 Report on Sears, Roebuck, October 1974, Box 209, Folder 5, Records of the Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago.
16 See for example, Roos (2008); Tuttle (2013).
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Figure 2. The BBB as still powerful advertising gatekeeper. Source: Chicago Tribune (1975).
gies to specific ones. And their calculations invariably
change with shifting political fortunes, economic pres-
sures, and socio-cultural realities. One potential dynamic
worth keeping in mind is institutional amnesia, espe-
cially over generational time frames. The early BBBs fos-
tered extensive professionalization among its leaders,
as well as an esprit de corps that insulated it at least
partly from the views and preferences of its corporate
and smaller business sponsors. As those early cohorts of
officialdom retired, however, the organizations proved
more amenable to a redirection of purpose, along with
an associated redirection of legitimation strategies.
The long-term history of the American Truth-in-Ad-
vertising movement also suggests that the individuals re-
sponsible for directing non-governmentalmodes of regu-
lation remain attuned to wider currents of trust (or skep-
ticism) in the organs of state power. As popular faith in
American government waxed during the middle third of
the twentieth century, the BBBs adopted strategies and
public justifications predicated more on co-regulation
than self-regulation, with greater acceptance of policy di-
rection from the state. As popular faith in American gov-
ernmentwaned during the final quarter of the twentieth-
century, the BBB network’s practice, ethos, and presen-
tation rejected co-regulation as the most appropriate
frame for regulating candor in the marketplace.
A third implication of this organizational history con-
cerns the potential for, and perhaps the likelihood of,
trade-offs in the pursuit of institutional reputation. For
roughly a half-century after their founding, the BBBs
managed to build legitimacy with each of their major
stakeholders—the business community, the state, and
the wider public. But as differences in the perspective
and interests of these constituencies widened in the
1970s, BBB leaders found that steps to sustain or deepen
standing with one of these groups risked undermining le-
gitimacy with others. Thus the turn to curry favor with
businesses in the 1980s and 1990s eventually undercut
popular faith in BBB’s independence and commitment to
consumer interests.
One can only discern such patterns and turning
points by taking the long view—that is, by reconstruct-
ing the historical evolution of private regulatory bodies.
An obvious next step would be to compare the dynamics
of legitimation at the BBBs with other longstanding self-
regulatory entities, to assess howmuch the BBB story re-
flects a common trajectory for modern self-regulatory in-
stitutions. In the American case, some obvious points of
comparison would be stock and commodity exchanges,
accrediting bodies for the professions, Underwriters’ Lab-
oratory, which sets safety standards for consumer prod-
ucts, and sectoral organizations such as the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operators and the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation.17 There are, of course, numerous analogues in
other societies, as well as international self-regulatory
bodies. Many of the former, like European Chambers of
Commerce, have much longer histories than the BBBs
(Bennett, 2011). Some of the latter, like the Interna-
tional Standards Organization, have existed for roughly
the same amount of time. (Murphy & Yates, 2009). Oth-
ers aremore recent creations. The intensification of glob-
alization over the last four decades has encouraged the
creation of myriad international third-party mechanisms
of regulatory governance, especially within the domains
of environmental and labor standards, though many of
these bodies have staked out ground that emphasizes
17 For an overview of many of these institutions, along with citations to a wide social science literature on them, see Balleisen (2014).
18 For entry points into a voluminous scholarship, see: Bartley (2007); Vogel (2010).
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a lack of dependence on businesses and trade asso-
ciations.18 A collection of historical case studies, both
within and across national boundaries, will be crucial to
identify more general patterns in attempts to legitimate
private regulation, as well as the impacts and ironies of
those efforts.
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